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NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS/CIVIL PROCEDURE-Is IT THE OFFICER OR
THE

GENTLEMAN?:

ISSUES

OF

CAPACITY

IN

§ 1983

ACTIONS

BROUGHT IN FEDERAL COURT
INTRODUCTION

Robert Biggs had been vomiting every night for sixteen
nights.! He had yet to receive the new medication that the prison
psychiatrist had prescribed for him more than two weeks before. 2
He had been told that the prison did not have any of the medication
available and it would have to be ordered from another prison's
pharmacy. The medicine arrived ten days after the prescription was
written-unfortunately for Mr. Biggs, it arrived on the last working
day before Christmas. 3 Six more days passed before Biggs received
the proper medication. 4
Biggs filed two grievances, both of which were denied, and
eventually filed a pro se suit against various prison officials, includ
ing the superintendent and the prison nurse. S He alleged that the
defendants had acted with deliberate indifference to his medical
needs and, in so doing, had violated his rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 6 He brought his suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of ac
tion against any person who violates the federal rights of another
while acting under the color of state law. 7 He sought compensatory
1.
2.
3.

Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 58 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Section 1983 provides in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000).
323
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damages for suffering caused by the denial of proper medical
treatment. 8
The district court dismissed his complaint. 9 Biggs's pleading
was unclear as to whether he was suing the prison officials in their
official or personal capacities. Applying a presumption that § 1983
defendants are sued only in their official capacities unless the com
plaint clearly states otherwise (hereinafter the "bright-line" ap
proach), the court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution bars all claims for damages against state agents sued in
their official capacities. 10
Biggs appealed the dismissal.H In deciding his claim of error,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit could, on the one
hand, agree with the district court and uphold the official-capacity
presumption, thereby aligning itself with the Eighth and Sixth Cir
cuitsP Alternatively, it could, like the majority of federal courts of
appeals, adopt a less stringent approach, looking instead to the na
ture of the claims made, the defenses raised, and the course of the
proceedings (hereinafter the "course-of-proceedings"13 approach)
to make a determination of the capacity in which the defendants
were sued. 14
The Fourth Circuit adopted the majority position and reversed
the dismissal of Biggs's claim;15 but the choice it faced is one that
places two fundamental interests in tension. The first is that the
federal system is set up to ensure that, whenever possible, claims
are litigated on their merits, rather than disposed of on procedural
grounds. 16 On the other hand, federal courts are courts of limited
8. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 58.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 59.
12. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1989); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591
(6th Cir. 1989).
13. As used in this context, the term appears to come from the Supreme Court's
decision in Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985). There, the plaintiff's initial pleading
was filed prior to the Court's decision in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), partially overruling its holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961). In explaining the resulting discrepancies in the complaint when viewed
through a post-Monell lens, the Court stated, "The course of proceedings after Monell
was decided did, however, make it abundantly clear that the action against [Defendant]
was in his official capacity and only in that capacity." Brandon, 469 U.S. at 469.
14. See, e.g., Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1326 (2d Cir. 1993); Houston v. Reich,
932 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1991); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990);
Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1987).
15. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 60.
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
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jurisdiction and have no power to entertain matters that fall outside
the scope of authority granted by the Constitution and Congress.17
From the point of view of the bright-line courts, an explicit
statement that a § 1983 defendant is being sued individually is re
quired because the Eleventh Amendment removes official-capacity
claims from the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.IS
From the countervailing perspective, this is a misunderstanding of
the nature of federal jurisdiction and a state's immunity from suit,19
Both sides agree that neither a state nor its officials can be sued for
damages. Both sides agree that a § 1983 plaintiff should make clear
in his complaint that his suit is brought against the defendant offi
cial in his or her individual capacity.
But the simple fact is that complaints are often unclear. Are
those who leave capacity ambiguous to be denied the opportunity
to litigate their rights? On the other hand, should a federal court be
permitted to entertain a case over which its jurisdiction is not ap
parent from the outset?
These questions, and the approaches taken by the U.S. courts
of appeals in trying to resolve them, are the focus of this Note. Part
I will set out the major points of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding the Eleventh Amendment. Part II traces the progress of
the more relevant § 1983 precedents delivered by the Court. Part
III details the bases of the majority and minority positions regard
ing the necessity of specific pleading of capacity. Finally, Part IV
examines the majority and minority positions in light of the hold
ings and statements of the Supreme Court relative to this issue and
ultimately concludes that both the majority and minority ap
proaches are unsatisfactory. Instead, this Note suggests, the best
approach involves a substantive reading of the complaint to deter
mine whether the defendant has been sued individually or officially.
The inquiry should be limited to the four corners of the complaint,
but should not hinge on the inclusion of certain magic words or
phrases.
It should further be noted at the outset that the Eleventh
Amendment and § 1983 are two immense areas of federal law, re
plete with any number of judicial fictions, inconsistencies and out
right contradictions. The intricacies of either subject are beyond
17. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 2.2 (3d ed. 1999); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.1
(3d ed. 1999).
18. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989).
19. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 60.
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the scope of this Note and have been well examined elsewhere. 20
The discussion of them here is simply to provide background for the
question at hand, rather than attempt to resolve the attendant and
lingering questions.
I.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 21

In 1793, in one of its earliest en banc decisions, the U.S. Su
preme Court ruled that a resident of South Carolina could sue the
State of Georgia for recovery of Revolutionary War debts. 22 The
states adamantly resisted the decision,23 and within a year the Elev
enth Amendment was drafted and submitted to the states specifi
cally to overrule the Court.24
The Amendment, by its terms, alters the grant of authority
contained in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. 25 It removes from
20. See generally William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than
a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); Carlos Manuel Vaz
quez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997); Vicki C.
Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity,
98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); William Burnham, "Beam Me Up, There's No Intelligent Life
Here": A Dialogue on the Eleventh Amendment with Lawyers from Mars, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 551 (1996); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47 (1998); Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under § 1983:
Municipal Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503 (1999);
Christopher J. Pettit, The Evolution of Government Liability Under Section 1983, 24 ST.
MARY's L.J. 145 (1992); Gloria Jean Rottell, Paying the Price: It's Time to Hold Munici
palities Liable for Punitive Damages Under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, 10 J.L. & POL'y 189
(2001).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
22. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
23. In Georgia, for example, the state House of Representatives passed a bill pro
viding that anyone who tried to enforce the judgment would be '''guilty of a felony, and
shall suffer death, without the benefit of clergy, by being hanged.''' Fletcher, supra note
20, at 1058 (quoting AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Nov. 23, 1793).
24. U.S. CaNST. amend. XI, Historical Notes, in 1 U.S.c. at LXIII (2000). The
Amendment was submitted to the states on March 4, 1794 and ten states ratified it the
same year. [d. It was declared to be ratified by three quarters of the states on Jan. 8,
1798.ld.
25. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
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the jurisdiction of the federal courts any suits commenced against a
state by a citizen of another state, or by any foreign citizen or sub
ject. Since at least 1890, however, the Supreme Court has given the
Amendment a reading much broader than its terms, treating it as a
textual reflection of the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity.26
Accordingly, the Court has indicated that sovereign immunity
is a bedrock principle, incorporated in the very structure of the
Constitution. 27 That is, the principle predates the Constitution and
so can be fairly read into the framework of that document. 28 Its
supporters contend that state governments, and state treasuries,
need to be protected against the financial drain that would result
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; 
to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of
another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof;-and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
(emphasis added to indicate the affected language).
26. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). This doctrine, a holdover from En
glish common law, held that the king could not be sued in his own courts. Sovereignty
was manifest in the person of the King. An incident of that sovereignty was immunity
from suit. As stated in Blackstone's Commentaries:
[F]irst, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-emi
nence. 'Rex est vicarius ... et minister Dei in terra: omnis quidem sub eo est, et
ipse sub nul/o, nisi tantum sub Deo (The king is the vicegerent [sic] and minis
ter of God on earth: all are subject to him; and he is subject to none but God
alone)'.... Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king,
even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *241-42. Blackstone goes on to write that "if
any person has ... a just demand upon the king, he must petition him to his court of
chancery, where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace, though not
upon compulsion." Id. at *243. This was seen as a matter of natural law since "[a]
subject ... so long as he continues a subject, hath no way to oblige his prince to give
him his due ... though no wise prince will ever refuse to stand a lawful contract." Id. at
*243-44.
27. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,713 (1999).
We have ... sometimes referred to the States' immunity from suit as 'Eleventh
Amendment immunity.' The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of
a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor
is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather ... the States'
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the
States' enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they re
tain today ... except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain con
stitutional Amendments.
Id.; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 179
(2d ed. 2002).
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 180.
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from damage judgments entered against them. 29 Those who would
do away with the doctrine contend that it has no support in the
words of the Constitution and was not something intended to be
adopted by the Framers. 3D This argument reasons that broad state
immunity from suit makes it impossible for a wronged citizen to
recover when the state infringes on her rights; that a citizen may be
deprived of life, liberty or property by a state and have no forum
for redress.
The debate, to a certain extent, is over trust. The defenders of
sovereign immunity believe that the doctrine places an appropriate
faith in government to do right. Detractors argue that history and
human nature renders such trust ill-founded. 31 As the Eleventh
Amendment and sovereign immunity play a significant role in the
debate over pleading requirements for § 1983 plaintiffs, a review of
some of the fundamental principles in this area is appropriate.
A.

Expansion of the Amendment Beyond its Terms: Hans v.
Louisiana

Whatever one may think of it, the Eleventh Amendment has
been interpreted as a bar to all private suits against the states. This
is so whether the claim is brought under the federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction, or their jurisdiction over questions of federal law. In
Hans v. Louisiana, the Court recognized that the Amendment did
not itself prohibit private suits against a state by its own citizens.32
Nevertheless, the Court believed that it would have been absurd for
Congress to have intended to bar suits against states by out-of-state
residents and aliens, but still permit such suits by in-state re
sidents. 33 Dealing squarely with the question of whether a state
may be sued in federal court by one of its own citizens under the
court's federal question jurisdiction, the Court stated that an affirm
ative answer would give satisfaction to "an attempt to strain the
Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or
dreamed of. "34 Despite the petitioner's contention that the Elev
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
31. Id.
32. 134 u.s. 1 (1890).
33. Id. at 15; see also Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1039.
34. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. In making this assertion, the Court was referring to
passages from Hamilton's Federalist No. 81 and from the responses of Madison and
Marshall to the objections of Patrick Henry and George Mason to the language of Arti
cle III extending the judicial power to "controversies between a state and citizens of
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enth Amendment should be construed on its terms, the Court re
fused to so limit its scope, declaring, "[t]he suability of a State
without its consent was a thing unknown to the law."35
For the Hans Court, neither the Eleventh Amendment, nor the
original text of Article III, could be read to allow a cause of action
to be maintained against a state by an individual, regardless of the
individual's in-state status, where the state had not consented to be
sued. 36 Since Hans, the Court has held to this interpretation.37 In
fact, the Court has extended the prohibition to suits in admiralty
and to suits commenced by foreign nations against the states. 38
another state" and "between a state... and foreign ... citizens or subjects." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Court quotes Hamilton's statement that
[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general prac
tice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is
now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.
Hans, 134 U.S. at 13. The Court further quotes Madison's response to Henry and Ma
son at the Virginia ratifying convention:
[The federal jurisdiction] in controversies between a State and citizens of an
other State is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the
power of individuals to call any State into court. ... It appears to me that this
[clause] can have no operation but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in
the federal courts; and if a State should condescend to be a party, this court
may take cognizance of it.
Id. at 14. Marshall is quoted in the same vein:
I hope that no gentleman will think that a State will be called at the bar of a
federal court .... It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should
be dragged before a court. The intent is to enable States to recover claims of
individuals residing in other States.
Id.
35. Hans, 134 U.S. at 16.
36. See id. at 12 (citing with approval Justice Iredell's dissenting opInIOn in
Chisholm arguing that the Constitution was not intended to provide for "new and un
heard of remedies, by subjecting sovereign states to actions at the suit of individuals").
37. See, e.g., Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.c. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754
(2002); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halder
man, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934); Wil
liams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 575-77 (1933).
38. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1040 (citing Ex parte New York., No.1, 256 U.S.
490 (1921), and Monaco, 292 U.S. at 313). Justice Scalia in 1989 wrote of the Hans
decision,
What we said ... was, essentially, that the Eleventh Amendment was impor
tant not merely for what it said, but for what it reflected: a consensus that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States as well as for the Federal Govern
ment, was part of the understood background against which the Constitution
was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep
away.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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Nevertheless, the Eleventh Amendment, at least as inter
preted, has been thought by many to be contrary to this country's
founding ideal of government bound by the rule of law. 39 Perhaps
because of this tension, a number of mechanisms have developed to
get around the Amendment's prohibitions and to try to ensure the
rights of individuals and the compliance of states with federallaw. 40
The Supreme Court has allowed: (1) suits to be maintained against
state officers; (2) states to waive immunity and consent to suit; and
(3) Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity by stat
ute in certain circumstances. 41
B.

Avoiding the Amendment
1.

The Ex parte Young Doctrine

The maintenance of a suit against a state officer without run
ning afoul of the Eleventh Amendment is made possible by the
Court's decision in Ex parte Young. 42 There, the Court held that a
suit commenced against the Attorney General of Minnesota to en
join him from enforcing a possibly unconstitutional Minnesota stat
ute was not a suit against the state itself and so was not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. 43 Since the relief sought would operate
solely against Young as Attorney General, and since Young was the
officer charged with the enforcement of the Act, the Court rea
soned that this was not a circumstance in which the state was the
real party in interest, and allowed the sought after relief against
Young. 44
39. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 20, at 1685-86 ("The Eleventh Amendment has
long been regarded as an embarrassment to the United States' aspirations to be a gov
ernment of laws and not of men.... [T)he Amendment is in substantial tension with the
rule-of-Iaw axiom that for every federal right there must be a remedy enforceable in
federal court."); Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1040-41 ("[A) broad constitutional prohibi
tion against suing states in federal court is unworkable in a federal system premised in
important part on controlling state behavior by federal law in order to protect private
individuals.").
40. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 180.
41. Id.
42. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
43. Id. at 159.
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use
of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of the
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not
affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an ille
gal act on the part of a state official ....
/d.
44. Id. at 154-55. "[T)he State might be the real party ... when the relief sought
enures to it alone ...." Id. at 155. "[I)t is plain that such officer must have some
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The doctrine of Ex parte Young has been widely championed
as an indispensable means of preventing the states from trampling
on the constitutional rights of their citizens.45 However, it is
founded on the fiction that a state officer executing the duties of his
office is somehow separate from the state as an entity.46 A state,
after all, can only act through its officers and other agents. 47
The inherent fiction of Young has led at least one commentator
to describe the principle as "unsatisfactory" and doctrinally "un
tidy."48 Nevertheless, the Young principle does provide "considera
ble federal judicial control over state behavior and permits
generally effective remedies against wrongful acts of state
officers."49
Under the Young doctrine, prospective injunctive relief, when
sought against a state official, is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Likewise, injunctive relief is not barred even when
compliance with the injunction will lead to funds being expended
from the state treasury. 50 What is categorically not permitted, and
where the Supreme Court appears to have hung its hat for the time
being, are suits seeking retrospective monetary relief. 51 It does not
matter whether these suits are for damages or equitable restitu
connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as a
representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party." Id. at
157.
45. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 200.
46. See id. at 201.
47. The Young fiction also gives rise to a further question: if, under Young, a state
officer is stripped of authority when attempting to enforce an unconstitutional law, is
there still state action as required for there to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amend
ment? In such circumstances, the Court has held that the conduct of a state officer that
is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection is still state action for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Home Telephone Co. and Telegraph v. Los Angeles,
227 U.S. 278, 285 (1913); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 201-02.
48. Fletcher, supra note 20, 1041. Professor Fletcher notes,
[W]hen the dominant form of relief against state officers was the negative in
junction, it was generally feasible to distinguish between permitted injunctions
that merely required cessation of certain official behavior and forbidden dam
age awards against state officers .... In the last thirty years however, when
affirmative injunctions against state officers have become relatively common
and when damage awards against state officers are available under certain cir
cumstances, the Court has expanded considerably the potential range of appli
cation of the Ex parte Young fiction.
Id.
49. Id.
50. 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS Acrs § 14:72 (3d ed. 2001)
(citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971».
51. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668-69.
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tion. 52 Nor does it matter whether the state is being sued directly or
indirectly through a state official sued in his official capacity.53 So,
while the Young doctrine helps to some degree with the problems
raised by the Eleventh Amendment, the Amendment still provides
a blanket protection to states in situations where retrospective re
lief is the only appropriate option. 54
2.

State Consent or Waiver

In addition to situations in which the Young doctrine may be
applied, the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment may be
avoided if a state consents to suit. 55 This is where, from a jurisdic
tional standpoint, the Eleventh Amendment occupies an area
unique to itself. In general, restrictions on the subject-matter juris
diction of the federal courts cannot be "waived" by either party, nor
can the parties consent to having the case adjudicated in the federal
forum when that forum otherwise lacks jurisdiction.56
If the Eleventh Amendment is viewed as a jurisdictional bar, it
seems discordant with the principles underlying the limitation of ju
dicial power to allow the bar to be removed by the consent of a
party.57 This apparent inconsistency notwithstanding, however, "if
a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action."58 Here the Elev
enth Amendment's relation to the common law doctrine of sover
eign immunity becomes clear, as it was historically the prerogative
of the sovereign to consent to answer and defend a suit in his
courts.59
52. Id.
53. SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 14:71.
54. See Vazquez, supra note 20, at 1686.
[The] narrowing of the sphere of the Amendment's practical operation does
not dispose of the rule-of-law problems created by the Eleventh Amendment.
The rule-of-law ideal insists that federal courts have the power not just to stop
ongoing violations of federal law, but also to remedy at least the most egre
gious past violations as well.
Id.

55. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), superseded by
statute, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat.
1845 (1986).
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the par
ties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action. ").
57. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 215.
58. SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 14:74 (quoting Atascadero State Hasp., 473 U.S. at
238).
59. See supra note 26; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 215.
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In the context of a § 1983 action, however, a state's consent to
suit may be irrelevant. 6o In Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police, the Supreme Court held that states are not "persons" within
the meaning of that term as used in § 1983.61 If states are not even
included in the meaning of the statute, then no suit can be main
tained against a state under § 1983 even if that state expressly
consented. 62
3.

Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity

The third mechanism for avoidance of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is congressional abrogation. Congress, as part of a partic
ular piece of legislation, may make the Eleventh Amendment inap
plicable and open the states up to suit and liability, provided it
expressly states its intention to do so in the statute. 63 Whether such
abrogation is permissible has been a matter of some controversy
and how one answers the question is largely a function of the view
one takes of the scope of the Amendment. 64
If the Amendment is seen as a limitation solely on the federal
judicial power, then it has no effect on Congress and that body may
remove state sovereign immunity for the purposes of a particular
statute. 65 If, on the other hand, the Amendment is seen as a bar to
federal subject matter jurisdiction, then under principles that have
been settled for over two hundred years, Congress may not expand
the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the boundaries of the
Constitution. 66 It would therefore be outside of the authority of
Congress to pass a law purporting to abrogate the Eleventh
60. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 85 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis
senting); SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 14:74.
61. Will, 491 U.S. at 64 (majority opinion).
62. See SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 14:74. "[T]he core holding of Will is to construe
the word 'person' under § 1983 to exclude states, and thus 'neither a federal court or a
state court may entertain a § 1983 action against such a defendant.'" Id. (quoting Howl
ett ex rei. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990)).
63. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,99 (1984); Fitzpat
rick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
64. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 220.
65. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 18 (1989); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 27, at 220 (citing John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergov
ernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Is
sues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682 (1976)).
66. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding § 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 to be an unconstitutional expansion of the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 221.
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Amendment immunity of the states. As it stands today, Congress
may abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by stat
ute, but only when legislating under certain of its enumerated
powers. 67
Congress may only legislate pursuant to the powers conferred
on it by the Constitution. 68 Those powers are enumerated in Arti
cle I, § 8 of the Constitution and are further granted by several
Amendments. 69 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is typical:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla
tion, the provisions of this article."70 In 1976, the Court held that
the Civil Rights Act of 196471 permissibly authorized private suits
for damages directly against a state since the Act was passed to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 Holding
that the sovereignty of the states and the principles embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment were "necessarily limited" by the enforce
ment clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated,
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising leg
islative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitu
tional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a
constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own
terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Con
gress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for
67. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 221.
68. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
69. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty
fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments contain enforcement clauses. The Eighteenth
Amendment did as well, however the Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-first
Amendment. As for the Article I powers, the language of each granting clause makes
clear that Congress may make such laws as are necessary to exercise the power granted.
The Article then gives Congress the general grant of power "[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in rele
vant part,
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
U.S.c. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2000».
72. See generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state offi
cials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.?3

In 1989, the Court extended this holding to include Acts of
Congress passed under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 74 In find
ing that Congress may abrogate state immunity from suit when it is
legislating under the Commerce Clause, Justice Brennan relied on
Court precedent7 5 as well as the nature of the Commerce Power. 76
The Court, however, overruled this opinion in 1996.77 Semi
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida involved another congressional act7 s
that was clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity and
was passed pursuant to the Commerce Power-in this case, Con
gress's authority to "regulate commerce . . . with the Indian
73. /d. at 456.
74. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power .... [t]o regulate commerce ... among the
several States."). Union Gas considered whether the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) expressed a Con
gressional intent to authorize suits against the states in federal court, and if so, whether
that authorization was within the commerce power. The Court answered "yes" to the
first question and "yes" to the second, although somewhat tentatively. Justice Brennan
wrote the opinion of the Court with respect to the question of congressional intent.
This part of the opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, B1ackmun, Stevens, and Scalia.
The part of Justice Brennan's opinion addressing the question of abrogation of the
Eleventh Amendment under the Commerce Clause was joined only by Justices Mar
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice White wrote a separate opinion in which he
agreed that Congress has the authority to abrogate state immunity under Article I, but
disagreed with the reasoning of the plurality.
75. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14-19 (Part III.A of the opinion). Acknowledging that
the Court had never "squarely resolved" the issue of the relation between the Com
merce Power and the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Brennan nevertheless concluded
that the Court's prior cases unmistakably sent the message that "the power to regulate
commerce includes the power to override States' immunity from suit, but [the Court]
will not conclude that Congress has overridden this immunity unless it does so clearly."
Id. at 14-15.
76. Id. at 19-23 (Part I1I.B of the opinion). For Justice Brennan, the very nature
of the power conferred by the Commerce Clause included the power to abrogate state
immunity. He reasoned that, just as the states assented to national control over the
regulation of commerce, so too they agreed to relinquish their immunity in the event
that Congress found it necessary, in exercising the power granted by the Commerce
Clause, to hold the states liable for damages. The states, therefore, are "not 'uncon
senting'; they gave their consent all at once, by ratifying the Constitution, rather than
on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 19-20.
77. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
78. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified
at 25 U.S.c. §§ 2701-2721 (2000)).
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tribes. "79
In overruling Union Gas, the Court held that Article I of the
Constitution may not be used to circumvent the limitations placed
on judicial power by the Eleventh Amendment. 80 It is worth quot
ing the Court's rationale:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the back
ground principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when
the subject of the suit is an area ... that is under the exclusive
control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authori
zation of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. 81

Under the law as it stands today, the Eleventh Amendment
presents a jurisdictional bar to all suits commenced against a state
by a private citizen.82 It does not, however, bar suits against a state
by another state; nor does it bar suits commenced against a state by
the United States. 83 There are three mechanisms of ameliorating
the impact of the Eleventh Amendment. First, an individual may
seek prospective injunctive relief from an ongoing violation of fed
eral law by bringing an Ex parte Young action against a state of
ficer. 84 Second, a state may consent to suit and thereby waive the
immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment. 85 Finally, Con
gress may abrogate state immunity by clear statutory intent; how
ever, after Seminole Tribe, it appears that this is only available
79. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In the six years since Union Gas, the makeup of
the Court had changed. Three of the four members of the Union Gas plurality (Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) had left the Court. Gone also was Justice White,
who had agreed that Congress could abrogate under the Commerce Clause. Justice
Clarence Thomas replaced Justice Marshall and aligned himself with the Union Gas
dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy).
While concluding that Congress clearly intended to make the states subject to suit
under the statute, and finding that "no principled distinction" could be drawn between
the Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses, Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63, the Court
held that" Union Gas has proved to be a solitary departure from established law" and
that "both the result in Union Gas and the plurality's rationale depart from our estab
lished understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted func
tion of Article 111." Id. at 66.
80. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
81. Id. at 72.
82. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
83. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,745 n.21 (1981); United States v. Missis
sippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
84. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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when Congress is legislating pursuant to the enforcement power
conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 86
Plaintiffs in federal court are obliged to state the grounds on
which the jurisdiction of the court rests in their initial pleading.87
They are further obliged to state the capacity of the parties to sue
or be sued, if such a statement is necessary to show jurisdiction.88
The Eleventh Amendment is one of the provisions by which the
federal courts are limited in the types of suits they can entertain.
The disagreement between the bright-line and course-of-proceed
ings rationales centers on the nature of the limitation imposed by
the Amendment and the extent of responsibility that can, in fair
ness, be placed on the § 1983 plaintiff to clearly identify in her com
plaint the capacity in which she is suing the defendant. 89

II.

SECTION

1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is one ofthe
most important, and most often used, federal laws on the books.90
The statute provides a private cause of action against any person
who, while acting under the color of state law, infringes on an
other's rights under the Constitution or federal law. 91 Conse
quently, it is most often state or local government officials who are
sued under § 1983. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment can playa sig
nificant role in the direction of § 1983 litigation and the body of
case law in this area. The discussion below sets out a brief history
of § 1983 and traces some of the milestone § 1983 decisions of the
Supreme Court.
86. See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(a).
89. See infra Part IV.
90. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 451 (quoting MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN
E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES 2 (3d ed. 1997».
Between April 1, 2004 and March 31, 2005, 35,364 private civil rights actions were filed
in federal district courts. A further 22,745 actions were brought by prisoners over
prison conditions or civil rights violations. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTIC,
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY NATURE OF SUIT AND DIS
TRICT, DURING THE 12 MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2005 (2005), http://www.us
courts.gov/caseload2005/tables/C03mar05.pdf. While an exact breakdown of the partic
ular statutes under which each case was filed is unavailable, § 1983 provides for a gen
eral remedy for violations of any individual right secured by the Constitution or federal
law. See supra note 7. Thus, § 1983 claims are often included in actions brought pursu
ant to federal statutes regarding voting, employment, accommodations, welfare, or
other rights.
91. See text of statute, supra note 7.
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Early History, Monroe, and Monell

Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of April 20, 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. 92 On
March 23 of that year, President Ulysses S. Grant sent a message to
Congress stating,
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union
rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails
and the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such
a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the
Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond the con
trol of the State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the
Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of existing
laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore,
I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Con
gress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the
enforcement of law in all parts of the United States. 93

Five days later, H.R. 320 was introduced on the House floor by
Representative Shellabarger. 94
The Supreme Court has summarized the congressional debate
on H.R. 320 on a number of occasions. 95 In referring to the portion
of the Act that became § 1983, the Court has stated that three goals
are apparent. 96 First, the Act sought to override certain state
laws. 97 Second, the Act sought to give a federal remedy in cases
where state law was inadequate. 98 Finally, the Act sought to pro
vide a federal remedy in cases where, although there was a state
92. Ch. XXII, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Section 1 of the Act, which became § 1983,
provided in relevant part:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any per
son within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States,
shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
93. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-73 (1961) (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., 244 (1871».
94. Monell V. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665
(1978). The bill as it was introduced, and as it was adopted into law, was entitled, "An
Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. at 13.
95. See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-90; Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-95.
96. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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remedy that was theoretically applicable and adequate, the state
remedy was unavailable in practice. 99
Section 1 of the Act, which was eventually codified as § 1983,
created a federal cause of action for the violation of constitutional
rights committed "under color of" state law.1Oo Though the Senate
Report focused heavily on violations committed by the Klan and its
members, § 1 was not directed at them, but rather at the state offi
cials who allowed such violations to go without redress.1O I The sub
sequent sections of H.R. 320 and of the Act as adopted dealt more
specifically with activities and conspiracies such as those engaged in
by the Klan. 102 Section 1 made it through both the House and Sen
ate without amendment and was enacted as introduced. Io3 The
Civil Rights Act of 1871 passed the Senate by a vote of 36 to 13 on
April 19. 104 The Act was passed by the House the next day, less
99. Id. at 174. The situation in the South, at least in the minds of the supporters
of the bilI, was grave enough to warrant federal intervention. This much is clear from
statements on the House and Senate floors that presented a dramatic picture of torture
and murder committed against black citizens as well as white Unionists and agents of
the federal government while the state authorities did little to bring the offenders to
justice. Representative Lowe of Kansas spoke of "murder ... stalking abroad in dis
guise" and stated that "while whippings and lynchings and banishment have been vis
ited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found
inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective." Id. at 175 (quoting CONGo
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871». Representative Beatty of Ohio pointed to
"voluminous and unquestionable" proof that states were denying their citizens the
equal protection of the law: "Men were murdered, houses were burned, women were
outraged, men were scourged, and officers of the law shot down; and the State made no
successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress to the
outraged and innocent." Id. (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1871)).
100. Ch. XXII, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
101. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175-76. During its consideration of the proposed legisla
tion, Congress had before it the 600 page report of the Select Committee of the Senate
to Investigate Alleged Outrages in the Southern States, detailing the civil rights viola
tions in the South and the lack of action on the part of state authorities in dealing with
the perpetrators. S. REP. No. 42-1 (1871). The Committee had taken testimony from
"representatives of all shades of political opinion," including "State and Federal judges,
prosecuting officers, political editors, ministers of the gospel, private citizens both white
and colored, members of what is popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan, magistrates,
constables, members of the bar, [and] men who have been scourged and abused by
bands of men in disguise." S. REP. No. 42-1, at 2 (1871). The conclusion drawn by
Congress that the situation in the South required federal intervention was based on this
report. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174, 183; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 454.
102. See Ch. XXII, §§ 2-6, 17 Stat. at 13-15.
103. Monell V. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665
(1978).
104. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L.
REV. 959, 974 n.93 (1987).

340

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:323

than a month after its introduction.lo5
Though it seems somewhat incongruent with the apparent en
thusiasm with which the Act was passed, for many years after its
enactment, § 1983 seemed almost a dead letter. 106 From 1871 to
1920 a mere twenty-one cases were decided under § 1983, and none
under the conspiracy provisions l07 of the Act.1 08 As late as 1960,
§ 1983 litigation made up a miniscule portion of the federal docket,
with only 287 cases being commenced in or removed to federal
court in that year. 109 This trend began to change dramatically in
1961 with the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape.1l0
In Monroe, the Court held that Congress intended § 1983 "to
give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges
and immunities by an official's abuse of his position. "111 Thus, the
"under color of law" language of the statute did not merely mean
that liability would attach only when the wrongful acts were com
mitted with the authority of some state statute or regulation.1 l2
Rather, the actions of an official that are outside of his authority,
105. /d.
106. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 455-56.
107. Ch. XXII, § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14 (1871).
108. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil
Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). The reasons for this lack of vitality lie largely in
the shifting of the historical tides. The Act had been passed by the Reconstruction
Congress. Reconstruction came to an end in 1877 after the Republican Party agreed to
abandon it in exchange for Rutherford Hayes being declared President over Samuel
Tilden. American Experience, Reconstruction: the Second Civil War, timeline, http://
www.pbs.orglwgbh/amexlreconstructionlstates/sUimeline2.html (last visited March 27,
2006). With the end of Reconstruction, so too came the end of Northern interest in the
rights of African Americans in the South. Furthermore, as it turned out, federal judges
had no more of an interest in allowing the vindication of black rights than did state
judges. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 455. Also, the Supreme Court at this time took
a restrictive view of the authority of the federal government to pass civil rights legisla
tion. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 17, at 455.
109. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 456 (citing THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL
RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 86 (2d ed. 1987».
110. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The case arose out of a raid on the petitioners' home by
the Chicago Police Department. The Monroes filed suit under § 1983 alleging that their
home was entered and searched without warrant and that Mr. Monroe was arrested and
detained without warrant in violation of their constitutional rights. Thirteen police of
ficers and the City of Chicago were named as defendants. Id. at 169-70. The District
Court dismissed the complaint, agreeing with the City that it could not be held liable
under § 1983, nor could it be held liable for "acts committed in performance of its
governmental functions." Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
111. Id. at 172.
112. See id.
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but" 'made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law,''' and which violate the federal rights of an
other, "'[are] action[s] taken under color of state law."'113 This
holding significantly expanded the range of possible defendants
under § 1983. 114
But where the Court gave, the Court also took away. In the
same opinion, the Court upheld co-defendant City of Chicago's
contention that Congress did not intend to include municipalities
within the meaning of "persons" as used in § 1983. 115 This limit
remained in place for seventeen years until the Court decided Mo
nell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,116
which represents the second major expansion of the scope of liabil
ity under § 1983.
Monell provided an opportunity for the Court to revisit its
analysis of the legislative history of § 1983. The Court began by
recapping the Monroe Court's reasoning that the 42d Congress's
rejection of the Sherman Amendment was conclusive evidence of
Congressional intent to exclude municipal corporations from liabil
ity under § 1983.117 After re-examination, however, the Monell
113. [d. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941».
114. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
704-05 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
115. The Court found compelling the fact that a proposed amendment to the Act
of 1871 (the Sherman Amendment) that would have imposed municipal liability for
violent acts committed within its boundaries was rejected by the House and by the
Conference Committee and ultimately not included in the Act. Monroe, 365 at 188-90.
The Court concluded that the response to the Sherman Amendment "was so antagonis
tic that we cannot believe that the word "person" was used in this particular Act to
include [municipalities]." Id. at 191. The Court found further support for its position in
the permissive wording of the Act of February 25,1871 (the Dictionary Act, Ch. LXXI,
§ 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871», which stated that the word "person" may be interpreted to
include "bodies politic and corporate" but did not require such an interpretation.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190-91.
116. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The suit was brought by a class of female employees of
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of New York City. Id. at
660. The basis of their complaint was that the Department and the Board had com
pelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence prior to the time such leave
was required for medical reasons. Id. at 660-61. Though the District Court held that the
practice was unconstitutional, the plaintiffs' claim for back pay was denied "because
any such damages would come ultimately from the City of New York and ... circum
vent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape." [d. at 662. The
Court of Appeals affirmed and held that, despite being sued solely in their official ca
pacities, the individual defendants were "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. How
ever, a damages action against them could not go forward since any damages assessed
against them would "have to be paid by a city that was held not to be amenable to such
action in Monroe v. Pape." Id.
117. Id. at 664.

342

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:323

Court found that the "liability imposed by [§ 1983] was something
very different from that imposed by the amendment. "118 On the
basis of its review of the legislative history, the Monell Court con
cluded that the Monroe Court had "incorrectly equated" the objec
tions to the Sherman Amendment with objections to municipal
liability under § 1983. 119 Accordingly, the Court held that Congress
did not intend to exclude municipalities from the scope of § 1983,
and overruled Monroe "insofar as it [held] that local governments
are wholly immune from suit under § 1983."120
Having concluded that municipalities were not excluded from
the scope of § 1983, the question still remained as to whether they
were actually included; that is, whether Congress intended that mu
nicipal corporations be included in the statutory language "any per
son."121 Again, the Court looked to the debates surrounding the
passage of the 1871 Act and concluded that Congress meant to pro
vide a broad remedy for civil rights violations in enacting § 1983. 122
Since municipal corporations could, just as well as natural persons,
violate these rights through their policies and official acts, and since
Congress intended the section to be broadly interpreted, "there is
no reason to suppose that municipal corporations would have been
excluded from the sweep of [§ 1983)."123
118. Id. at 682.
119. Id. at 665. The Court sets out three distinctions between the Sherman
Amendment and § 1983 in support of its conclusion. First, the Sherman Amendment
was not an amendment to the section that became § 1983; rather it was to be included
as a separate section of the Act. Id. at 666. Second, the main objection to the Sherman
Amendment was that it sought to unconstitutionally impose a requirement on munici
palities to keep the peace. Id. at 674. There was no such objection to § 1983. The Court
here points to a distinction that was recognized in the debates on the Act between
imposing a federal obligation to keep the peace (as would be required by the amend
ment) and imposing civil liability for damages on a municipal corporation that was obli
gated under state law to keep the peace but had failed to do so and thus violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 679. Finally, many of those who voted against the
amendment voted in favor of the section of the Act that became § 1983, thus confirming
that Congress recognized the difference between the obligation sought to be imposed
by the amendment and the liability sought to be imposed by § 1983. Id. at 682.
120. Id. at 663.
121. Id. at 683.
122. Id. at 685. Noting that the remedy provided by § 1983 applied to whites as
well as blacks, the Court pointed to the statement of Congressman Shellabarger, the
sponsor of the bill, who identified § 1983 as remedial, and quoted Justice Story: "Where
a power is remedial in its nature there is much reason to contend that it ought to be
construed liberally ...." Id. at 684.
123. Id. at 686. As further support for this view the Court pointed, in the first
place, to Congressman Bingham's belief that uncompensated takings by municipalities,
such as the one at issue in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that
the provisions of the Fifth Amendment were enforceable only against the Federal Gov
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Quern v. Jordan

With Quem v. Jordan, the Court began to delineate the bound
aries of state liability and immunity under § 1983.124 The action
arose out of the wrongful denial of welfare benefits to a class of
plaintiffs.125 At its core, the decision reaffirmed the Court's earlier
holding in Edelman v. Jordan 126 that retrospective monetary relief
against states is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, while pro
spective injunctive relief against state officers, even if such relief
will deplete funds from the state treasury, is allowed. 127 Quem
went further, however, and considered whether the Monell holding
could be extended to cover state as well as municipal governments.
Addressing the respondent's contention that the Edelman holding
had been "eviscerated" by the Court's holding in Monell, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated, "This court's holding in
Monell was 'limited to local government units which are not consid
ered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes ....' "128
While admitting that both the supporters and opponents of the
1871 Act believed that it drastically changed the relationship be
tween the federal government and the governments of the states,
the Court found that
neither logic, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor the legislative history of the 1871
Act compels, or even warrants, a leap from this proposition to
the conclusion that Congress intended by the general language of
the Act to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of
ernment), would be actionable under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 687. Further, the
Court noted that, by 1871, corporations were treated as persons for almost every pur
pose under law. Id. Finally, the Court looked to the Dictionary Act, and its definition
of "persons" as inclusive of "bodies politic and corporate [in all acts hereinafter
passed]." Id. at 688; Ch. LXXI, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). Believing the Monroe Court's
focus on the word "may" was misplaced, the Court stated that the purpose of the Dic
tionary Act was to provide rules of construction for congressional Acts. Monell, 436
U.S. at 690 n.53. In that context, if the definitions provided were merely permissible,
rather than mandatory, "there would be no rules at all." Id. Under Monell, "[l]ocal
governing bodies ... can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or
injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements
or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690. The suability of local governments
under § 1983 is limited, however, to circumstances where action taken in pursuance of
an official policy causes the constitutional tort. Id. at 691.
124. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
125. Id. at 333.
126. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
127. Quem, 440 U.S. at 337.
128. Id. at 338.
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the several States.1 29
The Court found no evidence that Congress "considered and
firmly decided to abrogate" the states' immunity under the Elev
enth Amendment and concluded that Congress did not intend to do
so by enacting § 1983. 130
C.

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police

The question before the Court in Will was whether a state, or
state official acting in his official capacity, is considered a "person"
within the meaning of § 1983.131 The case came to the U.S. Su
preme Court from the Supreme Court of Michigan, which had held
in the negative as to both questions. 132 The Court took the case to
resolve a conflict that had arisen since its holding in Monell. 133
Over a decade earlier, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court had
used Monroe's holding that a city is not a "person" under § 1983 to
reason that the statute "could not have been intended to include
States as parties defendan1."134 After Monell's partial overruling of
Monroe, it was thought by some courts that the rationale for ex
cluding states from the sweep of "persons" under § 1983 had also
been undercut. 135 As the Will case came from a state court system,
the Eleventh Amendment did not apply and the question of a
state's "personhood" was squarely at issue.136
While not an Eleventh Amendment case, the Amendment
played a strong role in the Court's reasoning that the phrase "any
person" in § 1983 was not intended to include states. First, the
Court applied the rule that if Congress intends to "alter the usual
Constitutional balance" of power between the state and federal
governments, that intent must be "unmistakably clear" in the lan
guage of the statute.13 7 Finding the language of § 1983 to fall "far
short" of that mark, the Court then stated that although Congress
129. Id. at 342.
130. Id. at 345.
131. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,60 (1989).
132. Smith v. Mich. Dep't of Public Health, 410 N.W.2d 749, 750 (Mich. 1987).
133. Will, 491 U.S. at 61-62.
134. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976).
135. Will, 491 U.S. at 61-62.
136. Id. at 63-64. This would no longer be entirely true in light of the Court's
holding in 1999 that a state enjoys immunity from suit in its own courts, as well as in
federal courts. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,754 (1999). Under Alden, while the text
of the Amendment applies only to the federal judiciary, the structural principle of sov
ereign immunity retains equal significance in both the federal and state systems.
137. Will, 491 U.S. at 65.
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intended to provide a federal forum for the litigation of civil rights
claims, it did not intend to provide such a forum when the claim was
asserted against a state. 138 The Eleventh Amendment still bars
such suits unless the state has consented or Congress has abrogated
the state's immunityP9
Having already concluded in Quem that Congress did not in
tend § 1983 to abrogate state immunity, and so did not intend to
provide a vehicle for states to be sued in federal court, the Court
found the suggestion that Congress nevertheless intended to create
a vehicle for states to be sued in state court to be unacceptable. 140
Congress was aware of, and intended to incorporate, common law
immunities and defenses in enacting § 1983.1 41 According to the
Court, the principle that a state cannot be sued in its own courts
without its consent was one of the most fundamental of these com
mon law immunities. 142
Under Will, § 1983 is a means of redress for the "official viola
tion of federally protected rights."143 However, this "does no more
than confirm that the section is directed against state action-ac
tion 'under color of' state law."l44 To make the leap to the proposi
tion that Congress intended to make the states themselves liable for
such actions-that it intended to make them "persons" under
§ 1983-is something the Court was unwilling to do. 145
From its conclusion that states are not "persons" for the pur
pose of § 1983, the Court quickly rejected the proposition that state
officials are § 1983 "persons" when acting in their official capac
ity.146 A suit against an official in his official capacity is not a suit
against the office-holder but a suit against the office.1 47 It is the
same as suing the state itself.148 Thus, not only are suits against
states under § 1983 barred in federal court, but they are barred in
state court as well. Suits against state officials that have the charac
138. Id. at 65-66.
139. Id. at 66. For discussion of state consent and congressional abrogation, see
supra Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3.
140. Id. at 67.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 68.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. /d. at 70-71.
147. Id. at 71 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)).
148. Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,165-66 (1985)).
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ter of suits against the office, rather than the individual, are also
barred.
D.

Hafer v. Melo

In 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hafer v.
Melo 149 to resolve what it saw as a misinterpretation of the Will
holding. 150 Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court be
gan with the following statement:
In [Will], we held that state officials 'acting in their official capac
ities' are outside the class of 'persons' subject to liability under
[§ 1983]. Petitioner takes this language to mean that § 1983 does
not authorize suits against state officers for damages arising from
official acts. We reject this reading of Will and hold that state
officials sued in their individual capacities are 'persons' for pur
poses of § 1983. 151
Hafer argued that liability under § 1983 depends on the capac
ity in which the official was acting at the time the plaintiff was in
jured. 152 According to Hafer, if an official is sued over conduct
occurring in the course of the exercise of her duties and within her
authority, the action is an official-capacity suit. Therefore, it cannot
proceed under § 1983 because, under Will, state officials acting in
their official capacities are not "persons" for the purpose of the
statute. 153
The Court disagreed, holding that "the phrase 'acting in their
official capacities' is best understood as a reference to the capacity
in which the officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer
inflicts the alleged injury."154 The Court then expressly foreclosed
any interpretation that could give rise to arguments like Hafer's.155
State officers are not "persons" when sued in their official capaci
ties because, for purposes of the suit, they stand in the place of the
government for which they work.156 As Will pointed out, to hold
otherwise would allow suits to proceed against the state simply by a
renaming of the parties. 157
149. 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
150. Id. at 22-23.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 26.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 27.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.1O (1989».
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Hafer's argument was built on flawed logic. As is familiar by
now, § 1983 was enacted to provide a remedy against the depriva
tion of federal rights by those acting with the apparent authority of
the state-i.e., under color of state law. 15s To allow Hafer's argu
ment to succeed would be to allow her to be immunized by the
same authority that gave her the opportunity to commit the viola
tion of rights in the first place. 159
Hafer also advanced the argument that the suit should be
barred on Eleventh Amendment grounds. 160 She contended that
allowing personal capacity suits against state officers would infringe
on state sovereignty by making state government less effective. 161
The Court quickly dispensed with this argument as well, declaring
that it has been settled law since the time of Ex parte Young that
the Eleventh Amendment does not provide cover to a state official
sued as an individua1. 162 Thus, the Court held (1) that state officials
sued in their individual capacities are "persons" within the meaning
of § 1983, (2) that the Eleventh Amendment presents no barrier to
such suits, and (3) that the official nature of a state official's acts
does not confer an absolute immunity from liability.1 63
One issue the Hafer Court left unresolved was how the nature
of the suit, whether personal or official capacity, is to be deter
mined in cases where it is not made clear in the pleadings. Noting
that the U.S. courts of appeals were divided on the question, the
Court suggested that it would be preferable to be clear from the
starU 64 However, as the matter was not properly before it, the
Court declined to resolve the issue. 165
III.
A.

THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE CiRCUITS

The Minority Position

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
long required § 1983 plaintiffs to make an explicit statement of ca
pacity in their complaints. 166 Absent an express statement that the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
Outboard

Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 24 n.*.
Id.
See, e.g., Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2005); Johnson v.
Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1999); Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d
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defendant is being sued individually, rather than officially, the court
has applied the conclusive presumption that the suit was brought
against the defendant in his or her official capacity only.1 67 As
such, if the plaintiff sought a remedy other than the sort of injunc
tive relief allowed under Ex parte Young, the suit was deemed to be
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 168 The court went so far as to
prescribe specific language that plaintiffs were to include in order to
ensure clarity.1 69
For a while the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the Eighth Circuit approach and adopted it for itself pO
Where the Sixth Circuit stands today is questionable. In any event,
two concerns were at the heart of the position adopted by these
courts. First, they wanted to ensure that a government officer de
fendant had adequate notice of personal liability to the plaintiff.1 71
Second, in the courts' view, only a clear statement of capacity
would negate the Eleventh Amendment problem that would other
wise be raised by the suit. l72
As to the first concern, under the bright-line view, government
officials should be made aware of the possible consequences of the
suit against them at the outset of the litigation. We want qualified
individuals to go into government service, and this goal would be
750 (8th Cir. 1997); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coli., 72 F.3d. 615 (8th Cir. 1995); Nix v.
Norman, 879 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1989).
167. Egerdahl, 72 F.3d at 619 ("If a plaintiff's complaint is silent about the capac
ity in which she is suing the defendant, we interpret the complaint as including only
official-capacity claims. ").
168. Nix, 879 F.2d at 432 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989» ("[U]nder the formal terms of the Eleventh Amendment, [a plaintiff] may not
bring an action solely against either the state or one of its agencies .... A state agent,
however, may be sued in his official capacity if the plaintiff merely seeks injunctive or
prospective relief for a legally cognizable claim. ").
169. Id. at 431 (requiring the statement "Plaintiff sues each and all defendants in
both their individual and official capacities").
170. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989) ("We adopt the Eighth
Circuit's interpretation of Will, which requires that plaintiffs seeking damages under
§ 1983 set forth clearly in their pleading that they are suing the state defendants in their
individual capacity for damages, not simply in their capacity as state officials. ").
171. Nix, 879 F.2d at 431 (requiring specific language that "guarantees that the
defendant receives prompt notice"); Wells, 891 F.2d at 593 (stating that the complaint in
this case insufficiently "alert[ed the defendant] officials that they may be personally
accountable for any damages liability").
172. Nix, 879 F.2d at 430 (citing Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir.
1984» ("The Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in
civil rights cases against states and their employees."); Wells, 891 F.2d at 593 ("[E]ven
liberalized pleading . . . cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain suits
against states and state officials when the Eleventh Amendment bars us from doing
so.").
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undermined if public servants could be surprised by a personal
judgment against them, the possibility of which they may not have
been aware at the outset of the litigationP3 Further, the public
servant defendant has certain choices to make regarding defense
strategy and the retaining of counsel that cannot be effectively
made unless the defendant knows in what capacity he or she is be
ing sued. 174 Additionally, without notice of the nature of the suit,
the "government defendant may ... fail to plead the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity and thereby waive [it]."175 This con
cern with providing adequate notice to the government defendant is
relevant both when the defendant is an employee of a local govern
ment and an employee of a state government.
The second concern of the bright-line position-the jurisdic
tional restriction imposed by the Eleventh Amendment-is only
present when the defendant is an employee of a state government.
Under this view, the Eleventh Amendment, combined with the
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules, requires that capacity
be specifically pled in the compiaintP6 This jurisdictional argu
ment only applies when defendants are state employees because the
Eleventh Amendment is not implicated when an action is brought
against a local government or its employees. 177
As articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Nix v. Norman, "[t]he
173. See Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 792 (6th Cir. 2001)
(Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (pointing to the "longstanding public policy of encourag
ing public service by protecting government officials from frivolous but nonetheless
debilitating litigation").
174. See id. at 79l.
Without such timely notice defendants might rely on their governmental em
ployer, fail to answer, and be subject to default judgment in their personal
capacities. Further, without early notice government defendants cannot prop
erly decide whether to retain independent counselor to participate in collec
tive defense strategies or settlement negotiations. Nor would the individual
defendants be able to assess how best to engage in discovery. Under the
course of proceedings analysis, individual capacity defendants are deprived of
the ability to make a multitude of decisions regarding their own defense.
Id.
175. Id. at 791-92. "By waiving the defense, the defendant may lose the protec
tions of the doctrine, which provides an immunity not only from liability, but from suit."
Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)).
176. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d
591, 593 (6th Cir. 1989); Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 777 (6th Cir. 2001)
(Suhrheinrich, J. dissenting).
177. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690
n.54 (1978) (noting that there is "no constitutional impediment to municipal liability"
under § 1983 because, inter alia, "local government units ... are not considered part of
the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes").
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Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional limit on federal
courts in civil rights cases against states and their employees. That
being the case, Rule 9(a) appears to require [the plaintiff] to make a
capacity stipulation in the complaint."178 Though the court did not
go into much detail regarding its reasoning, it appears that the
court's conclusion was the result of a straight application of the text
of the Amendment, as well as the holdings of Hans and Will.
First, the Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power shall
not be construed to extend" to suits brought against a state by citi
zens of another stateP9 Second, the holding in Hans further re
moved from the judicial power suits brought against a state by one
of its own citizens.18o Finally, the holding in Will established that an
official-capacity suit for damages against a state official is no differ
ent than a suit against the state for which that official works; as
such, a state official acting in his official capacity is not a "person"
within the meaning of § 1983.1 81
Taken together, the only way for a § 1983 plaintiff to recover
money damages in a suit against a state official is to sue the official
in his individual or personal capacity, causing the judgment to run
against the official's personal finances, rather than the state trea
sury.182 It further seems to be the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit
that this is the only way by which a federal court could gain the
power to entertain the matter in the first place-if sued officially,
(1) the state agent is not a person within the meaning of the statute
and so cannot be sued under it, and (2) any judgment would run
against the state itself, a circumstance not permitted by the Elev
enth Amendment. Accordingly, the individual capacity nature of
the suit is necessary to show the jurisdiction of the court and so
must be specifically averred in the complaint.

B.

The Majority Position

The Eighth Circuit does not have much company in its position
on the necessity of specific pleading of capacity.183 In 2001, the
178. 879 F.2d at 431 (citation omitted). "It is not necessary to aver the capacity of
a party to sue or be sued ... except to the extent required to show the jurisdiction of the
court." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(a).
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
180. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
18l. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
182. See Nix, 879 F.2d at 433 ("Monetary damages are unrecoverable against [the
official] in his official capacity ... as such an award would require an expenditure of
state funds.").
183. See Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 22 n.25 (1st Cir. 2004) (assembling opin
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Sixth Circuit, which had previously adopted the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning, appeared to reverse its position. 184 The majority in
Moore v. City of Harriman stated that its prior decision 185 specifi
cally endorsing that part of the Eighth Circuit's position that re
quired an express statement was not actually to be interpreted so
strictly.186 In an opinion written by Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin,
Jr., and joined by six other members of the court, the Sixth Circuit
announced that, despite its seeming adoption of the bright-line
analysis, it found a course-of-proceedings test to be the way to
gO.187 In fact, the court said it had always applied this test and had
"never applied such a strict interpretation" of its Wells decision as
to "requir[e] § 1983 plaintiffs to affirmatively plead 'individual ca
pacity' in the complaint."188 Thus, despite a strident protest from
the dissenting judges, it would appear that the Sixth Circuit has re
pudiated its former position and joined those circuits that apply
what has come to be known as the course-of-proceedings test to
§ 1983 complaints that leave ambiguous whether the defendant is
being sued personally or officially.
For the course-of-proceedings courts, an examination of the
nature of the complaint, the relief sought, and the litigation process
is the proper method to determine what was meant by the plaintiff
who has left capacity questionable. 189 First, the majority position
ions from the 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits adopting the
course-of· proceedings approach).
184. Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001).
185. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1989).
186. Moore, 272 F.3d at 772.
187. Id. at 775.
188. Id. at 772. The dissenting opinion took issue with the majority on a number
of levels. It criticized the majority's interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in
Will, it refuted the majority's position on the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, and it
argued vigorously against the majority's characterization of the court's prior holdings as
adopting a course-of-proceedings test. To this final point, the dissenting opinion lists,
over the span of almost eleven pages, all of the decisions of the court, both published
and unpublished, that applied the requirement of a specific statement of capacity. Id. at
778-89 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). The dissenters determined that the "inescapable
conclusion to be drawn from this catalog" was that the Sixth Circuit had "viewed the
Wells rule as requiring plaintiffs to affirmatively plead personal capacity in the com
plaint." Id. at 789.
189. See, e.g., Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2004). "Under the
'course of proceedings' test, courts are not limited by the presence or absence of lan
guage identifying capacity to suit on the face of the complaint alone. Rather courts may
examine 'the substance of the pleadings and the course of proceedings in order to deter
mine whether the suit is for individual or official liability.' " Id. (quoting Pride v. Does,
997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th CiT. 1993». "Factors relevant to this analysis include 'the nature
of the plaintiff's claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature
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holds that much can be learned regarding the defendant's level of
notice from an examination of the claims and defenses raised and
the way the parties have treated the suit. The First Circuit, for ex
ample, has found instructive whether a plaintiff seeks punitive dam
ages, since this is a remedy that can only be assessed against an
individua1. 190 Likewise, making a qualified immunity defense is in
dicative of the fact that the defendant had notice that the suit was
against him or her individually, since the qualified immunity de
fense is only available in the context of a personal capacity ac
tion.1 91 Going perhaps a step further, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has stated that the very fact that a § 1983 plaintiff is
seeking damages at all is sufficient to indicate that the government
official defendant is to be held personally liable. 192
Given the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
intended to tip the balance in favor of adjudication on the merits,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while adopting a pre
sumption that a § 1983 claim against a public official is an official
capacity claim, nevertheless held that the presumption cannot be
applied conclusively.1 93 Instead, the court advocated examining the
way the "parties have treated the suit. "194 In one instance, the
court found that the claims asserted in the pleadings, in addition to
of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, particularly claims of qualified
immunity.'" Id. (quoting Moore, 272 F.3d at 772 n.1). "A court may also take into
consideration 'whether the parties are still in the early stages of litigation,' ... including
whether amendment of the complaint may be appropriate." Id. (quoting Moore, 272
F.3d at 772 n.1). "No single factor is dispositive in an assessment of the course of pro
ceedings. 'Throughout, the underlying inquiry remains whether the plaintiff's intention
to hold a defendant personally liable can be ascertained fairly.'" Id. at 22-23 (quoting
Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995)).
190. Id. at 23.
191. Id.
192. Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Duckworth v.
Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1985)) ("[T]he ... presumption 'cannot be conclu
sive in a system such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create, in which the com
plaint does not fix the plaintiff's rights but may be amended at any time to conform to
the evidence.' "). The Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Proce
dure was Professor Charles A. Clark, who was later the Dean of Yale University Law
School. As the "dominant intellectual and operational force" behind the drafting of the
Rules, he brought to the task a commitment to reform and a conviction "that procedure
should be [something] entirely separate from substance." Jay S. Goodman, On the Fifti
eth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What did the Drafters Intend?,
21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 356-57 (1987). Clark's philosophy translated into two core
beliefs that can be seen throughout the Rules: first, "that all cases should be decided on
their merits," rather than won or lost by procedural tactics; second, that a fundamental
goal of all "litigation should be economy of time and resources." Id. at 357.
194. Shockley, 823 F.2d at 1071.
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the plaintiff's motion in limine and the good faith immunity defense
raised by the defendant, were sufficient to allow the conclusion that
the defendants were sued in their personal capacities.1 95 Though
generally unstated, the courts adopting the majority position seem
to exercise the principle that ambiguity in the pleadings should be
resolved in favor of the pleader in order to further the goal of meri
torious claims being fully and fairly litigated. 196
Finally, the courts that use a course-of-proceedings analysis
disagree with the minority position on the applicability and scope of
the Eleventh Amendment in this situation. As characterized by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Biggs v. Meadows, the
minority view is based on the premise that "the Eleventh Amend
ment operates as a substantive limitation on the subject-matter ju
risdiction of the federal courts. "197 As such, the minority position
requires an express averment of individual capacity "to demon
strate that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not implicated and
that jurisdiction is proper."198 However, this view, according to the
Fourth Circuit, "neglects the considerable differences between
Eleventh Amendment immunity and federal jurisdiction. "199 The
court points to three of these differences to illustrate its point.
First, the court states that Eleventh Amendment immunity is
an issue that may be raised at the court's discretion. 20o This is in
contrast with other subject-matter jurisdiction questions which the
court "must evaluate independent of the parties' contentions."201
This assertion is based on a footnote in a Supreme Court decision
stating that the Court "[has] never held that Eleventh Amendment
immunity is jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised and,
decided by this Court on its own motion."202 Second, the Biggs
court pointed to the ability of a state to waive its immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment.203 Such a waiver would allow a claim
195. Id.
196. See generally Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding a
self-drafted complaint by a non-native English speaking plaintiff to be sufficient under
the Federal Rules).
197. Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see FED. R. Cry. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action. ").
202. Biggs, 66 F.2d at 60 (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19
(1982)).
203. Id.
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against a state to go forward in federal court where otherwise the
state would be immune. 204 In contrast, other limitations on the sub
ject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts will stand regardless of
anything the parties do because "'no action of the parties can con
fer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court."'205 Finally, ac
cording to the Biggs court, "Congress has no power to override a
constitutional limitation on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts."206 It is well settled, however, that Congress can ab
rogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states, provided
it is legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and clearly
states its intention to do SO.207
Taking these distinctions into account, the court concluded that
"Eleventh Amendment immunity is not truly a limit on the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, but a block on the exercise
of that jurisdiction."208 Once this distinction is appreciated, says
the court, the reasoning of the minority position collapses and the
reverse becomes true-not only is an averment of capacity unnec
essary under Rule 9, but the Rule actually prohibits the imposition
of a standard of pleading more stringent than that set out in Rule
8. 209
As of today, the Sixth Circuit is generally cast as adhering to
the course-of-proceedings standard, leaving the Eighth Circuit as
the sole proponent of the bright-line approach. The Eighth Circuit's
position does not appear to have weakened at all, however. As re
cently as July of 2005 it reaffirmed the position it took in Nix.2IO
204. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), superseded by
statute, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat
1845 (1986).
205. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 60 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982».
206. Id.
207. Id. In support of its assertion, the Biggs court compares Atascadero, which
affirmed that" 'Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity
from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear,''' with Nat'l
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., which noted that "Congress cannot expand the
jurisdiction of the federal court beyond that granted in the Constitution." Biggs, 66 F.3d
at 60 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 and citing Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. TIdewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590 (1949».
208. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 60.
209. Id.
210. Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2005). Though in this case the
omission was not fatal, the court nevertheless stated that "[tJechnically, Larson's com
plaint had to 'contain a clear statement of his wish to sue defendants in their individual
capacities,'" id. at 939 (quoting Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coli., 72 F.3d 615, 620 (8th
Cir. 1995», and went on to reiterate that "without a clear statement that officials are
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The Supreme Court noted the disagreement among the circuits in
1992, but at the time declined to resolve the matter, as it was not
properly before the Court. 211 The Court suggested, echoing the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that it is preferable that a
plaintiff be clear in the first instance, so as to avoid any ambigu
ity.212 However, the very term "course of proceedings," as it is used
here, comes from another Supreme Court decision wherein the
Court indicated, in a slightly different situation, that the course of
proceedings would be sufficient to indicate the nature of the claims
at issue. 213 As will be seen, much of this debate is characterized by
a profusion of various and contradictory dicta statements of the Su
preme Court.

IV.

ANALYSIS

So where are we left? It is a basic principle that the federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.214 They cannot act beyond
the authority granted in Article III of the Constitution and the laws
passed in pursuance thereof. It is equally basic, however, that
courts of all kinds-whether state or federal, general or limited in
their jurisdiction-exist to do justice in accord with the laws and
principles of equity. Further, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
set up a system wherein matters are to be decided on their merits
whenever possible.
In the case of a § 1983 action against a local official, i.e., an
official of a municipal or county government, the effect of the offi
cial or personal capacity nature of the suit is more or less confined
to the damages that may be awarded. 215 However, as Robert Biggs
found out, in the case of a § 1983 action against a state employee,
being sued in personal capacities, complaint is interpreted as including only official
capacity claims." Id. at 939 n.3 (citing Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir.
1997».
211. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 24 n.* (1991).
212. Id.
213. See supra note 13 (describing origin of the term).
214. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at § 5.1; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (5th ed. 1994).
215. For example, in Powell v. Alexander, the defendant challenged the district
court's award of punitive damages on the grounds that she was sued solely in her offi
cial capacity and even if the plaintiff intended to hold her personally liable, she was
without notice of this intent. 391 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2004). Punitive damages are un
available in official-capacity suits against municipal officials because municipalities are
immune from punitive damages awards. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247 (1981). For an analysis of the Fact Concerts case and an argument that munici
pal corporations should be subject to punitive damages under § 1983, see Gloria Jean
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the question of official or personal capacity can be determinative of
whether the plaintiff is allowed to proceed with his action at all. 216
Everyone agrees that a § 1983 plaintiff should be clear in the
first instance to avoid any confusion, but this begs the question. If
plaintiffs were clear this issue would not come up. Are those who
leave capacity ambiguous to be denied the opportunity to litigate
their rights because of a possible Eleventh Amendment violation?
Conversely, should a federal court be permitted to entertain a mat
ter over which its jurisdiction is not apparent from the outset?
The plaintiff who sees his claim dismissed under the bright-line
analysis may seek leave to amend his complaint, but depending on
the posture of the case, such leave may not be his as a matter of
right and may be denied. 217 Bringing the suit in state court seemed
at one time to be a second option, but the Supreme Court recently
held that a state's sovereign immunity is just as applicable there as
in federal court. 218 Thus, unless the state has consented to suit, it
may not be sued in its own courts, either. Quite simply, it seems
that from time to time, based on the rationale of the Eighth Circuit
and a substantial minority of the Sixth Circuit, the § 1983 plaintiff
will find himself without remedy despite the fact that he has
brought a meritorious claim.
Both sides to this debate cast their arguments in Eleventh
Amendment terms. Therefore, this analysis will begin by examin
ing the bright-line and course-of-proceedings positions from that
perspective. It will go on to argue, however, that this characteriza
tion as an Eleventh Amendment problem is inaccurate, and stems
from a misapplication of Will v. Michigan Department of State Po
lice. Specifically, in reaching and discussing the Eleventh AmendRottell, Note, Paying the Price: It's Time to Hold Municipalities Liable for Punitive
Damages Under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, 10 J.L. & POL'y 189 (2001).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10.
217. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 433 n.3 (1989).
Although Nix neglected to name Norman in his individual capacity, she may
seek to do so on remand. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits a party, on motion to the district court, to amend her pleadings "when
justice so requires." It is a settled rule of practice that the trial court is vested
with sound discretion to grant or to refuse such a request. If the district court
subsequently allows Nix to add an individual-capacity claim against Norman,
she may also seek to reinstate her request for compensatory and punitive
damages.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
218. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) ("In light of history, practice, pre
cedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity
from private suit in their own courts ....").
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ment issue, the courts of appeals, like the dissenters in Will, are
presuming that § 1983 applies to states and their officers. The hold
ing of Will, however, was that the reach of § 1983 simply does not
include such parties. The issue, therefore, is not constitutional, but
rather statutory in scope.
A.

The Disagreement in Terms of the Eleventh Amendment

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated in Nix and
reiterated in subsequent cases that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment
presents a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in civil rights cases
against states and their employees. "219 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit adopted the same view in Wells .220 In so doing,
these courts treated the Eleventh Amendment as a restriction on
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, akin to the complete
diversity requirement. 221 As such, according to these courts, the
complaint must contain a clear statement that the defendant is sued
in his individual capacity in order to establish that the court has
jurisdiction over the claim.
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as
serted in Biggs that the Amendment "is not truly a limit on the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, but a block on the
exercise of that jurisdiction. "222 The court declared that the reason
ing of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits improperly conflated the sepa
rate principles of immunity and jurisdiction.223 For the Fourth
Circuit, and others adopting a course-of-proceedings approach, the
effect of the Amendment is more akin to other forms of common
law immunity available to public officials. The court did recognize,
219. Nix, 879 F.2d at 431 (citing Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir.
1984); see Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Arkan
sas, 127 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1997).
We . . . strictly enforce this pleading requirement because 'the Eleventh
Amendment presents a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in civil rights
cases against states and their employees.' Although other circuits have
adopted a more lenient pleading rule, we believe our rule is more consistent
with the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. (quoting Nix, 879 F.2d at 431) (internal citations omitted).
220. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1989).
221. 28 U.S.c. § 1332 provides in relevant part: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different
States ...." 28 U.S.c.§ 1332 (2000); see also Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806).
222. Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
223. Id. at 59-60.

358

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:323

however, that the Amendment IS at least somewhat
jurisdictional.224
At least partially, the divide among federal courts regarding
the proper treatment of the unclear § 1983 plaintiff is a reflection of
a disagreement regarding the nature of the barrier imposed by the
Eleventh Amendment itself. That is, whether it represents a limita
tion on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, or
rather presents a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction that otherwise
exists. The Fourth Circuit provided three examples of how the
Eleventh Amendment was unlike a limitation on the federal courts'
subject-matter jurisdiction: (1) the immunity conferred by the
Amendment may be waived by the defendant state whereas no ac
tion or consent of the parties can cure a jurisdictional defect;225 (2)
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states can be abrogated
by Congress, whereas Congress has no power to expand the juris
diction of the federal courts beyond the bounds set out in Article
III of the Constitution;226 and (3) courts have discretion to raise the
Eleventh Amendment on their own motion, whereas other ques
tions of subject-matter jurisdiction must be raised by a court sua
sponte as soon as it appears there may be a defect.227
That a state may consent to defend a suit otherwise barred by
the Amendment is well-settled,228 as is the principle that Congress
can abrogate the immunity of the states by express statement when
legislating pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.229 The
veracity of the Fourth Circuit's statement regarding the permissive
nature of a sua sponte assertion of the Amendment is less clear,
however. 23o
In making this assertion, the Fourth Circuit relied on a foot
note in the Supreme Court's decision in Patsy v. Board of Regents
224. Id. at 60 (quoting in part the statement in Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457
U.S. 496, 516 n.19 (1982), that" 'the Eleventh Amendment defense ... partakes of the
nature of a jurisdiction bar' ").
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), superseded by
statute, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat
1845 (1986).
229. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
230. See generally F. Ryan Keith, Note, Must Courts Raise the Eleventh Amend
ment Sua Sponte?: The Jurisdictional Difficulty of State Sovereign Immunity, 56 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1037 (1999) (providing a thorough analysis of whether courts must raise
Eleventh Amendment concerns on their own motion).
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of Florida. 231 There the Court stated that "because of the impor
tance of state law in analyzing Eleventh Amendment questions and
because the state may, under certain circumstances, waive this de
fense, we have never held that it is jurisdictional in the sense that it
must be raised and decided by this Court on its own motion."232
The Fourth Circuit does not mention, however, a case decided
by the Supreme Court just two years later that contradicts the Patsy
footnote. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the
Court stated that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limita
tion of the judicial power of the United States,"233 and that a court
must look at each claim before it in order to determine whether the
Amendment bars that claim. 234 The quoted language clearly places
the Eleventh Amendment on a par with other forms of subject-mat
ter jurisdiction, and the further admonition that the "court must ex
amine" each claim before it determines the claim's status under the
Amendment mandates the raising of the issue on the court's own
motion. 235
If the Amendment operates as a barrier to the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts, as Pennhurst indicates, the posi
tion of the bright-line courts is strengthened. Since a court would
have no authority to decide a case against a state officer unless the
suit was brought against the officer in his individual capacity, a
231.

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 515-16 n.19 (1982).
[d. at 516 n.19. This was a § 1983 case that was decided without reference to
the Eleventh Amendment. Though there were potential Eleventh Amendment issues
in the case, these issues had not been argued or briefed by the parties at any stage of the
trial or appeal process. The Court's footnote seems to be offering an explanation for
the appearance that the Court is ignoring the elephant in the room.
233. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984) (quot
ing Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933)).
234. [d. at 121.
235. [d. (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court characterizes the
Eleventh Amendment as an "exemplification" in the Constitution's text of the underly
ing doctrine of sovereign immunity. [d. at 98-99 (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S.
490, 497 (1921)). The doctrine itself is incorporated into the Constitution on a struc
tural and historical level, according to the Court, hence, "the principle of sovereign
immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art.
III." [d. at 98. The right of a sovereign state not to be sued without its consent is so
fundamental and had such a powerful bearing on the framing of the Constitution that
the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace au
thority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without
consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or
subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even
one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the
Amendment is but an exemplification.
[d. at 98-99 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921)).
232.
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statement in the complaint to that effect would be necessary under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a).
But the Fourth Circuit's contention that the Amendment oper
ates as a "block" on subject- matter jurisdiction that would other
wise be present finds some support in the Pennhurst decision as
well. In the same discussion referenced above, the Court states that
the Amendment "deprives a federal court of power to decide cer
tain claims against states that otherwise would be within the scope
of Article Ill's grant of jurisdiction."236 The Court used § 1983 as
an example, asserting that even a claim of violation of a constitu
tional right, brought pursuant to § 1983, would be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment if brought against a state. 237 This is so de
spite the fact that the claim arises under the Constitution and the
federal courts have jurisdiction over such claims pursuant to Article
III and 28 U.S.c. § 1331. 238
If the Amendment operates more as a block on jurisdiction
than a denial of jurisdiction altogether, it would be closer in nature
to personal, rather than subject-matter jurisdiction. Personal juris
diction may be waived by a party who appears and defends a suit,
and the court is under no call to raise the matter on its own. 239 The
question would thus lose the threshold nature it has under the
bright line view and become more akin to an affirmative defense.
The Court's statements in both Patsy and Pennhurst are dicta
and therefore have led to some disagreement in the courts of ap
peals as to the proper rule. 240 Moreover, the Supreme Court in two
more recent cases issued further contradictory statements regarding
the nature of the Eleventh Amendment as a jurisdictional bar. 241
236. Id. 119-20.
237. Id. at 120.
238. Section 1331 provides, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
239. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702-03 (1982).
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art.
III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement
recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restric
tion on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of indi
vidual liberty . . . . Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be
waived.
Id.
240. See Keith, supra note 230, at 1049, 1077 (concluding that "[t]he Pennhurst
standard is both preferable as a matter of policy and more accurate as a matter of
present Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence").
241. Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), with Wis.
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Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 242 used much of the same
language found in Pennhurst to declare that the jurisdiction of the
federal courts did not include suits against non-consenting states. 243
This seemed to place the Eleventh Amendment and the underlying
principles of sovereign immunity squarely in the category of sub
ject-matter jurisdiction and largely to nullify the Patsy footnote. 244
Two years later, however, the Court resurrected the Patsy foot
note in a unanimous opinion that made no mention of Seminole
Tribe. 245 In deciding the question of the effect of the Eleventh
Amendment on the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts, the
Court stated that the original jurisdiction of the federal courts is not
necessarily destroyed by the Amendment. 246
Rather, the Eleventh Amendment grants the State a legal power
to assert a sovereign immunity defense should it choose to do so.
The State can waive the defense. Nor need a court raise the de
fect on its own. Unless the State raises the matter, a court can
ignore it. 247

According to this definition, the Eleventh Amendment takes
on almost the same attributes as any other affirmative defense. 248
It is up to the defendant to raise the defense and the court is under
no obligation to take up the matter on its own.
On balance, however, the weight of the Supreme Court's ex
Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998). For a more detailed analysis of these
two cases see Keith, supra note 230, at 1066-7l.
242. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
243. See id. at 64.
244. Keith, supra note 230, at 1068.
245. Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998); see Keith, supra note
230, at 1069.
246. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389.
247. Id. (citations omitted).
248. The word "almost" is used here because, unlike other defenses which are
deemed waived if not raised at the outset or made in a motion, FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b), a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity can be raised at any time. This creates the pos
sibility that a state may assert the Eleventh Amendment on appeal, even though not
asserted at trial, and have any judgment rendered against it reversed or vacated for lack
of jurisdiction. The unfairness of this circumstance concerned Justice Kennedy, who
expressed his "doubts about the propriety of this rule" in his concurring opinion in
Schacht:
In permitting the belated assertion of the Eleventh Amendment bar, we allow
States to proceed to judgment without facing any real risk of adverse conse
quences. Should the State prevail, the plaintiff would be bound by principles
of res judicata. If the State were to lose, however, it could void the entire
judgment simply by asserting its immunity on appeal.
Schacht, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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isting precedent and dicta regarding the Eleventh Amendment
comes down against the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment
is not truly a jurisdictional barrier. To be sure, the Amendment
operates differently than other subject-matter jurisdiction limits.
This can be seen in the fact that jurisdiction may be had if the state
consents to suit.
But this ability of the states to consent flows from their nature
as sovereigns in the federal system. It should not be held to detract
from the effect of the Amendment on the authority of the federal
courts to entertain suits by private parties against a state. Under
our federal system, the individual states "retain 'a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty.' "249 Although their authority is curtailed by
their entrance into the Union under the Constitution, the states
themselves do not become organs of the federal government.
Rather, they "retain the dignity ... of sovereignty."25o It is part of
the nature of its retained sovereignty that a state cannot be made
amenable to suit by an individual without its consent. 251 It would
seem no less an infringement of that sovereignty to declare that a
state may not so consent. Rather than being viewed as a demon
stration of how Eleventh Amendment immunity is not jurisdic
tional, the ability of a state to consent is more properly seen as
simply a manifestation of its status as a residual sovereign.
Moreover, the statements in Patsy and Schacht notwithstand
ing, the proposition that the judicial power of the United States
does not, and never did, extend to private suits against the states is
one that the Court has expressed since 1890. 252 If this is the correct
view, then the issue of state immunity becomes a threshold matter
and absent a showing that jurisdiction exists, a federal court cannot
proceed. This view mandates that a court address possible sover
eign immunity problems on its own motion. This in turn supports
the Eighth Circuit's reading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a)
requiring the plaintiff to state that the defendant is being sued in his
individual capacity.
249. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39
(James Madison».
250. Id.
251. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
252. Id. "For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when es
tablishing the judicial power of the United States.'" Id. (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 15 (1890) and citing twenty-four subsequent cases in support).
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The Disagreement as a Misapplication of Will

In instances where the defendant is a state officer, both the
bright-line courts and the course-of-proceedings courts discuss ca
pacity pleading requirements in the context of the Eleventh
Amendment. 253 However, the relevant Supreme Court precedent
indicates that the Eleventh Amendment does not matter-at least
not as much as it would seem from the opinions of the U.S. courts
of appeals.
When the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the
bright-line standard expounded by the Eighth Circuit, it relied pri
marily on the Supreme Court's decision in Will v. Michigan Depart
ment of State Police. 254 The Sixth Circuit characterized the Will
decision, as the Eighth Circuit had previously, as holding that "state
officials sued in [their] official capacity for damages are absolutely
immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment."255 Will,
however, was not an Eleventh Amendment case. Will's holding
was that the word "persons," as used in § 1983, does not include the
states. 256 Since state agents sued in their official capacities are
deemed to be "the state" as well, such agents, when sued officially,
are not "persons" under § 1983 either. 257
The Will Court's reasoning in reaching these conclusions is
based in substantial part on Eleventh Amendment considerations,
but the decision itself is more a matter of statutory construction
253. See, e.g., Reames v. Oklahoma ex rei. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d
1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-807,2006 U.S. LEXIS 1994 (U.S. Feb.
27, 2006). "The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent plaintiffs from bringing suits
against state officials ... in their individual and personal capacities." Id. However, after
applying the course-of-proceedings test, the court found this plaintiff's suit to be against
the state and "therefore money damages [were] barred under the Eleventh Amend
ment." Id.; see also Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he
Eleventh Amendment does not bar damage claims against state officials acting in their
personal capacities."); Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The minority
view neglects the considerable differences between Eleventh Amendment immunity
and federal jurisdiction."); Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1993) ("It is well
settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 civil actions against the states but
permits such suits brought against state officials sued in their individual capacities.");
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment places
a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in civil rights cases against states and state em
ployees ....").
254. Wells, 891 F.2d at 592.
255. Id.
256. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("We hold that
neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under
§ 1983.").
257. Id.
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than constitutional explication. 258 The courts of appeals therefore
miss the mark in conducting the capacity debate solely on Eleventh
Amendment terms.
The effect of Will is that neither suits against states nor official
capacity suits for damages against state officers may go forward
under § 1983-not because of the Eleventh Amendment, but be
cause the statute does not provide for such a claim.259 In contrast,
the dissenting Justices would have held that states are, in fact, "per
sons" within the meaning of § 1983.260 Under this alternative, the
states would still enjoy immunity from suit, but could nevertheless
consent to being sued. Under the majority's holding, a state could
never itself be held liable for civil rights violations. Justice Bren
nan, writing in dissent and joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens, stated,
[A description of the far-reaching impact] of the Court's holding
... demonstrate[s] its unwisdom. If states are not "persons"
within the meaning of § 1983, then they may not be sued under
that statute regardless of whether they have consented to suit.
Even if . . . a State formally and explicitly consented to suits
against it in federal or state court, no § 1983 plaintiff could pro
ceed against it because States are not within the statute's cate
gory of possible defendants.261

For the dissenting Justices, a holding that would invalidate the
express consent of a state to be sued was incongruent with the prin
ciples of sovereignty and federalism that underlie Eleventh Amend
ment doctrine. 262 This is intuitive-if a state's immunity from suit is
an attendant part of its sovereign status, the corollary ability to con
sent to suit would seem to be no less a part of that status. Thus, a
holding that nullifies a state's consent represents no less an infringe
ment of state sovereignty than did the Chisholm holding in 1793.263
258. The majority looks at the statutory language and legislative history of § 1983,
but according to Justice Brennan's dissent does not do a thorough job of either. Id. at
72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggests that the majority wrongfully ap
plies Eleventh Amendment standards of deciphering legislative intent in a case where
the Amendment is not implicated (this was a pre-Alden, state-court action). Id. at 75
76. Brennan flatly disagrees with the majority's holding, finding that the 42d Congress
did intend to include states in the definition of "persons" under § 1983. Id. at 77.
259. Id. at 71 (majority opinion).
260. [d. at 77 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 93-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262. [d. at 86.
263. As earlier stated, supra text accompanying note 22, Chisholm v. Georgia
allowed a private citizen to sue the State of Georgia for the recovery of debts incurred
during the Revolutionary War and led directly to the drafting and ratification of the
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In discussing pleading requirements on Eleventh Amendment
terms, the courts of appeals are necessarily assuming that § 1983
has the potential to bring a state government or state officer within
its reach. Close adherence to the Will holding, that states and offi
cially-sued state officers are not within the statute's ambit, would
foreclose the need to consider the question on constitutional
grounds. These courts are going beyond the question of whether
states are "persons" to reach the question of whether the Eleventh
Amendment removes such a case from the jurisdiction of the fed
eral courts.
Only if states were, in fact, "persons" under § 1983 would it
become necessary to determine the jurisdictional effect of the Elev
enth Amendment. As noted by the majority in Alden, Will's "hold
ing that 42 U.S.c. § 1983 did not create a cause of action against the
states rendered it unnecessary to determine the scope of the States'
constitutional immunity from suit in their own courtS."264 The fact
that Will originated in a state court system does not matter here.
The Court's construction of § 1983 is applicable regardless of
whether the claim is brought in federal or state court. The category
of "persons" to whom the statute applies should not vary depending
on forum. Such a variance would give rise to a situation wherein a
state could consent to be sued in federal court, but be precluded
from doing so in its own courts. If, as stated by Alden, the fact that
the statute does not create a cause of action against states makes it
unnecessary in the state court context to consider the issue on sov
ereign immunity grounds, the same should hold true in federal
court. Thus, in reaching the sovereign immunity discussion, the ap
proach of the courts of appeals seems more in line with the reason
ing of the dissenting opinions in Will, rather than the holding of the
majority.265
Under Will, a § 1983 suit against a state or against a state of
ficer in his official capacity would be subject to dismissal because
the statute does not provide a remedy. Therefore, the strict reEleventh Amendment. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by statute, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI, as recognized in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
264. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,736 (1999).
265. Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, points out the logical discord caused by
the Will holding:
The Court having constructed an edifice for the purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment on the theory that the State is always the real party in interest in
a § 1983 official-capacity action against a state officer, I would think the ma
jority would be impelled to conclude that the State is a "person" under § 1983.
Will, 491 U.S. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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quirements of the Eighth Circuit again are justified, though for dif
ferent reasons. The only way, under Will, for a § 1983 plaintiff to
recover damages against a state officer is to sue that officer in his
individual capacity. Otherwise, the plaintiff will have failed to
make a "statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to
relief. "266
CONCLUSION

Whether the reasons are constitutional or statutory, it is neces
sary that a § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages make clear that he is
suing the defendant in the defendant's individual capacity. How
ever, in light of the premium the Federal Rules place on the adjudi
cation of claims on their merits, it seems unduly harsh to require
the plaintiff to make an express statement to that effect or face dis
missal. Looking instead to the nature of the claims, the defenses,
and the course of proceedings appears more equitable, particularly
in the case of a pro se plaintiff like Robert Biggs.
Nevertheless, the course-of-proceedings approach goes too far.
It seems unlikely that any plaintiff would be found to have intended
to sue the defendant solely in her official capacity, since to do so
would be litigation suicide. 267 Further, allowing an examination of
the defenses raised in response to the complaint can be misleading
because affirmative defenses are often perfunctorily inserted into
an answer, whether applicable or not, in order to ensure the de
fense is not waived.
Likewise, looking to the direction the litigation has taken will
tend to lead to an individual capacity conclusion. Whether a gov
ernment official is sued individually or officially, he is still a person
(though perhaps not a § 1983 "person") and the course of proceed
266. FED. R. ClV. P. 8(a)(2).
267. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 63-65 (1998). Professor Jeffries's survey of cases from 1991
through 1997 found that suits against state officers where capacity was left ambiguous
were "generally allowed ... to proceed. . . . Almost never did the courts refuse to
accept a properly pleaded complaint by coercively recharacterizing the complaint as
being 'really' against the state and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id.
But see Reames v. Oklahoma ex rei. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th
Cir. 2005) (applying course-of-proceedings analysis to § 1983 claims against employees
of two state agencies and finding the suit to be against the defendants in their official
capacity and properly dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds); United States ex
reI. Adrian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (reach
ing the same result in application of course-of-proceedings analysis to action brought
under False Claims Act).
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ings will almost certainly be replete with references to the official as
an individual, from which a court could determine that the plaintiff
intended to sue him as such and that the defendant knew he was
being so sued.
In short, the course-of-proceedings approach, while perhaps
founded on good intentions, is standardless and easily manipulated.
When capacity is left ambiguous in the complaint, the inquiry
should be confined to the four corners of the complaint. Within
those four corners, however, the complaint should be read substan
tively, rather than be held fatally deficient for lack of a certain sen
tence or formulation. This will ensure that federal courts remain
within their statutory and constitutional boundaries, while still af
fording the unclear plaintiff the fairness our system requires.
Jeffrey K. O'Connor*

* My deepest thanks to my loved ones, colleagues, and teachers. Their support,
guidance, and criticism made this possible. Any remaining mistakes are mine alone.
This Note is dedicated to the memory of Marion B. Langone, February 11, 1913 - Feb
ruary 28, 2006.

